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Mitigating the spread of disease is crucial for the well-being of agricultural production
systems. Implementing biosecurity disease prevention measures can be expensive,
so producers must balance the costs of biosecurity investments with the expected
benefits of reducing the risk of infections. To investigate the risk associated with this
decision making process, we developed an online experimental game that simulates
biosecurity investment allocation of a pork production facility during an outbreak.
Participants are presented with several scenarios that vary the visibility of the disease
status and biosecurity protection implemented at neighboring facilities. Certain rounds
allowed participants to spend resources to reduce uncertainty and reveal neighboring
biosecurity and/or disease status. We then test how this uncertainty affects the decisions
to spend simulation dollars to increase biosecurity and reduce risk. We recruited 50
attendees from the 2018 World Pork Expo to participate in our simulation. We compared
their performance to an opportunity sample of 50 online participants from the survey
crowdsourcing tool, Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). With respect to biosecurity
investment, we did not find a significant difference between the risk behaviors of industry
professionals and those of MTurk participants for each set of experimental scenarios.
Notably, we found that our sample of industry professionals opted to pay to reveal disease
and biosecurity information more often than MTurk participants. However, the biosecurity
investment decisions were not significantly different during rounds in which additional
information could be purchased. To further validate these findings, we compared the
risk associated with each group’s responses using a well-established risk assessment
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survey implementing paired lottery choices. Interestingly, we did not find a correlation in
risk quantified with simulated biosecurity investment in comparison to the paired lottery
choice survey. This may be evidence that general economic risk preferences may not
always translate into simulated behavioral risk, perhaps due to the contextual immersion
provided by experimental gaming simulations. Online recruitment tools can provide cost
effective research quality data that can be rapidly assembled in comparison to industry
professionals, who may be more challenging to sample at scale. Using a convenience
sample of industry professionals for validation can also provide additional insights into
the decision making process. These findings lend support to using online experimental
simulations for interpreting risk associated with a complex decision mechanism.
Keywords: experimental games, veterinary diseases, decision making, behavior, experimental economics, health
economics, data science
1. INTRODUCTION
Disease outbreaks across livestock production systems can have
devastating economic consequences. Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea
Virus (PEDv), for example, is a coronavirus that costs the
U.S. industry an estimated $900 million to $1.8 billion per
year (1–3). Here, biosecurity refers to the initiative to stem
the spread of disease in agriculture (4), which include a set of
tools for disease prevention (i.e., vaccines) along with sanitary
regulations and protocols that can mitigate disease transmission
across production systems. Increased biosecurity reduces disease
transmission between producers (5). However, biosecurity tools
and practices vary in cost and perceived efficacy (6, 7). Hence,
supply chain managers must balance the costs of biosecurity
investments with the expected benefits of reducing the risk of
infection. Our aim is to investigate the strategies used to achieve
this balance, by quantifying risk mitigation behaviors associated
with economic investment in biosecurity. Our research approach
focuses on applying digital simulations for studying this decision
making process.
Experimental gaming simulations, a branch of “serious
gaming,” are tailored interfaces that leverage software from game
design to recreate a complex decision mechanism (8–12). Here
we use simulations to collect decision making data and analyze
responses with respect to various visual stimuli that are designed
to communicate risk. This is our lab’s primary tool for studying
human behavior and how risk preference may influence the
spread of disease among agricultural supply chains (9, 13–15).
Although biosecurity has been shown to reduce disease
prevalence, widespread adoption of biosecurity varies,
possibly due to uncertainty in efficacy and return on
investment (7). Our experimental gaming simulation tests
risk preference with regards to several scenarios in which disease
prevalence and neighboring biosecurity visibility are varied.
By injecting different types of uncertainty into experimental
game simulations, we can explicitly observe response to
uncertainty and how it may change as risk communication
strategies adapt.
Our previous study (14) analyzed the risk associated with
biosecurity investment decisions across a multitude of disease
outbreak scenarios. Using a sample of 1,000 participants from
an online survey recruitment marketplace, Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk), we found three prominent risk strategies—risk
tolerant, opportunistic, and risk averse—by analyzing responses
with regard to disease threat. We then investigated how
information uncertainty affects the decision making process,
by varying the visibility of the disease spread and biosecurity
protection across each simulated population of farms (13, 14).
Among this sample, we found that high visibility in disease
spread led to more risk averse behaviors while high visibility in
biosecurity status led to more risk tolerance. We also investigated
how risk preference may differ among a sample of industry
professionals and stakeholders. We attended the 2018 World
Pork Expo, the world’s largest pork industry trade show attended
by thousands of producers and industry professionals (https://
worldpork.org/about-expo/all-about-expo). Here, we recruited
50 attendees to complete our experimental gaming simulation.
Their performance was then compared to 50 MTurk recruits, in
addition to the 1,000 recruits sampled in (14). When aggregating
across all experimental outbreak scenarios, we did not find a
significant difference in biosecurity investment risk distributions.
In this work, we aim to further investigate potential differences
in risk preference among World Pork Expo participants
and online recruits from MTurk. We compare biosecurity
investment decisions during each set of experimental scenarios
as well as the willingness to spend economic resources to
reduce uncertainty.
We also compare our sampled participants’ behavior using
a well-established risk assessment survey using paired lottery
choices (16). This context-free, multiple price list approach (17)
measures risk aversion with respect to economic preference
by varying the probability of a high and low payout. Using
their choices, participants can then be categorically grouped
into “Risk Seeking,” “Risk Neutral,” or “Risk Averse.” The main
difference between this paired lottery choice assessment and our
experimental gaming simulations is the context surrounding the
decision making process. The paired lottery choice assessment
attempts tomeasure underlying preferences in a purely economic
trade-off. Whereas the economic risk management associated
with biosecurity investment decisions are specifically framed in
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the context of agricultural outbreak mitigation. We compare
risk preferences associated with lottery choices against simulated
biosecurity investment strategies between World Pork Expo
participants and MTurk recruits.
Several studies investigated how risk aversion delineated using
this paired lottery choice assessment (16) have compared to
real world behaviors. Experimental market trading behaviors
were found to correlate with paired choice lottery risk aversion
(18). Negative health related behaviors including cigarette
smoking, heavy drinking, obesity, and seat-belt non-compliance
were found to be anti-correlated with surveyed risk aversion
(19). Similarly, a generalized self-assessment risk survey could
predict surveyed lottery risk aversion (20). These contexts
based risk aversion measures were actually in some cases
better predictors of malbehaviors in comparison to multiple
price list assessments (21). This difference in performance may
be attributed to additional background information captured
regarding the individuals’ preferences using context based
measures of risk aversion.
Providing contextual background to the studied decision
making process can have a pronounced effect on risk mitigation.
For example, the domain specific risk-taking scale (DOSPERT)
(22) is a context driven risk assessment questionnaire which has
shown promising results in characterizing risk averse behaviors
across several content domains. This flexible measurement is
useful for categorizing risk with respect to content areas in which
individuals may exhibit various levels of risk aversion depending
on the framing. Context based risk assessments can provide
additional insights into behavioral response and how risk may
fluctuate with respect to situational framing.
Our experimental gaming simulation exemplifies this
initiative for capturing contextually driven risk mitigation
behaviors. We found that risk aversion characterized by
multiple choice lottery assessment differed from risk associated
with behaviors in our simulated environment. This supports
the argument that context driven risk assessment may be
more appropriate for identifying behavioral risk regarding
specific domains. Capturing these nuanced behaviors may
prove illusive in the lens of traditional multiple price list risk
assessment frameworks.
Our previous findings (14) did not detect a difference in
biosecurity investment decisions between World Pork Expo
attendees and recruits from MTurk. However, aside from
biosecurity investment, other behavioral aspects may differ
between these cohorts. Our current study investigates how Pork
Expo attendees and online recruits from Amazon Mechanical
Turk may diverge in their decision making with respect to each
tested experimental scenario. Although we previously found the
overall distributions of risk were comparable between Pork Expo
and MTurk groups, it is also important to highlight where there
may be differences in simulated behavior. This validation process
is necessary when recruiting large convenience samples from
online survey marketplaces.
Along with the ability to invest in biosecurity, our simulation
allowed participants to purchase information to reduce
uncertainty in the decision making process by revealing infection
and biosecurity status of neighboring facilities. Due to expo
attendees’ industry knowledge and expertise, we may expect to
find a measurable difference in their willingness to purchase
information in comparison to a opportunity sample of online
recruits. We also investigate whether Pork Expo participants’
biosecurity investment strategies and experimental earnings (i.e.,
their performance) differed across each particular experimental
scenario. This leads to our first tested hypothesis:
(H1): Participants with industry knowledge will invest more
experimental resources to procure information and reduce
uncertainty in the decision making process.
In addition, we compare risk associated with simulated
biosecurity investment to risk aversion measured using a paired
lottery choice survey (16). The paired lottery choice survey
has a well-defined payoff function where economic benefit
and risk are clearly established during each decision. Our
experimental simulation’s risk decision tradeoff is more obscured
by visual assessment, assumptions regarding disease spread,
and protection offered by neighboring facilities’ biosecurity
implementation. Our study investigates how these two risk
assessment frameworks align. (23) found real-world farmer
production risk, as formulated by (24), correlated with paired
lottery choice risk aversion. Wemay expect that participants who
investmore simulated resources in biosecurity would behave with
more risk aversion in the paired lottery choices. We formulate
this hypothesis (which we later reject) as:
(H2): More investment in simulated biosecurity will
correspond with more risk aversion in the paired lottery
choice assessment.
2. METHODS
We created a digital application to assess the impact of economic
consequences on decisional risk. The experimental gaming
simulation and risk assessment survey were engineered using the
Unity Development Platform. The final application was deployed
using WebGL (25) and hosted on the University of Vermont’s
web server, where simulation decision data were stored in a
relational database. The 2018 World Pork Expo participants
completed the experiment in our booth using provided tablet
computers. The 50 online participants were contracted using
Amazon Mechanical Turk and compensated through Amazon
with a base pay of $2.00 USD for successfully completing
the assignment along with a bonus payment based upon their
simulation performance. On average MTurk participants earned
an additional $7.93 (σ = $4.98) and completed the experiment
in 10.92 min (σ = 4.80 min), after the introductory on-boarding.
We paid the participants at the World Pork Expo a higher rate to
bolster attendance and interest. Pork Expo participants earned
on average $16.11 (σ = $4.26) over 15.97 min (σ = 4.91
min) to complete the simulation and survey. These monetary
incentives are crucial to our experimental design and have been
found to increase salience and immersion in the decision making
process (26, 27).
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FIGURE 1 | Simulation interfaces for a sample of our experimental treatment scenarios: (A) High Disease Uncertainty, No Biosecurity Uncertainty (B) No Uncertainty
(C) Full Uncertainty, Option to pay to reveal disease and biosecurity status (D) High Biosecurity Uncertainty, No Disease Uncertainty. Every combination of these
information treatments were tested.
2.1. Biosecurity Investment Experimental
Game
Our methods were derived from the online experimental
simulation featured in (13). The experimental game allowed
participants to allocate simulated resources toward biosecurity
investment during disease outbreak scenarios with disease
spreading across a production system. Each experiment began
with an introductory slide show, which framed the study
design and informed the player of the game mechanics and
interface. The game introduction slideshow can be found in
(14). We obtained informed consent from each participant,
during our prepared introductory slide presentation prior to
the experiment. These practices were accepted by the University
of Vermont Institutional Review Board concerning experiments
using human participants (University of Vermont IRB #
CHRBSS-16-232-IRB).
Each of our 50 industry participants and MTurk online
participants completed 32 simulated outbreak scenarios (i.e.,
6 month decision years), for up to 192 decisions per person
(depending upon infections). We collected a total of 18,716
decisions to compare (9437 Pork Expo; 9279 MTurk). Numbers
differ slightly because decisions during a round would be
truncated if the participant’s facility became infected. Each
round of decision making featured adaptations to the interface
and/or information regarding the infection status and biosecurity
allocation among the population of farms (see Figure 1). The
participant is in charge of a single production facility, surrounded
by 50 computer-controlled facilities. Every round consists of six
decision months in which players have the choice to invest their
simulation dollars in more biosecurity for their own facility. The
simulated dollars earned were converted to U.S. currency after
completion of the experiment. Online recruits were compensated
at a rate of $1 USD to $23,500 simulation dollars, on top of
their base pay of $2.00 USD for completing the assignment.
Participants from the World Pork Expo were paid a rate $1 USD
to $12,000 simulation dollars.
Biosecurity investment reduces the probability of infection.
Players could sequentially increase their biosecurity status once
per each of the six decision months at the cost of $1,000
simulation dollars, from “None” to “Low” to “Medium” and a
maximum of “High.” In our simulation, each successive level of
biosecurity implemented reduces the probability of infection by
25%. If the player did not wish to invest in biosecurity, they could
choose “No Action” to continue to the next decision month. At
the end of each decision month, the infection could progress to
any production facility with a varying infection rate probability
(pinf = 0.15) that decreased with distance from the infection
source. Explicitly, the raw probability of transmission between
an infected facility and a clean facility separated by distance, D,
would be calculated as
pinf
D2
, which was then adjusted by the
clean facility’s biosecurity level. If the player’s facility became
infected, the round would immediately end and the player would
lose $25,000 simulation dollars. For each consecutive round,
the participant’s biosecurity status was reset to “None” and the
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FIGURE 2 | Paired lottery choice risk Assessment interface: a sample of the menu design of the paired lottery choice survey.
infection and neighboring set of farms were re-initialized by
randomly reassigning the geographical positions and biosecurity
status of each facility.
One quarter of all rounds presented full visibility of the
infection status and neighboring biosecurity to the player.
The other 75% of tested treatments injected uncertainty into
this decision mechanism by cloaking the infection status and
system-wide biosecurity configuration. Additionally, certain
rounds featured the capability to purchase more information
regarding the infection status and/or biosecurity allotment for
10 neighboring facilities. The cost for revealing this information
varied between either $1,000 or $2,000 simulation dollars.
Examples of our user interface (UI) for a sample of our
information treatment types are given in Figure 1.
2.2. Paired Lottery Choice Risk
Assessment
We created a digital version of the risk assessment paired lottery
choice survey featured in (16). Participants are instructed to
choose their preference across ten distinct paired lottery choices.
Each pair of choices features a safer “Option A” in comparison to
a more risky “Option B,” which has a higher pay gap between the
two reward probabilities. For example, the first choice features
Option A as a 1/10 chance to earn $2.00 and a 9/10 chance
to earn $1.60, while Option B presents a 1/10 chance to earn
$3.85 and a 9/10 chance to earn $0.10. Here, only the most risk
tolerant of individuals may consider choosing Option B over
Option A. This probability gap between the higher and lower
payment for each choice sequentially increased, such that the
more risky option becomes more viable as the survey progresses
(i.e., the expected payoff of Option B becomes greater than the
expected payoff of Option A). By choice 7, the payout probability
is now 7/10 for each high reward and 3/10 for the low reward (see
Figure 2). Here, it becomes somewhat ambiguous which is the
more appropriate option, creating an interesting risk dilemma
to study.
A natural “crossover point” occurs where a rational individual
may move from choosing the safer Option A to a more risky
Option B. We quantify risk using the ratio that “Option A”
was chosen over the ten paired lottery choices. Participants had
the option to revise their choices up until their final decision,
after which a random number generator was used to select one
of their decisions and then determine their reward. Randomly
implementing one of their choices insured that every choice was
incentive-compatible, meaning that participants had an incentive
to reveal their true preferences. Our digital interface of this
paired lottery survey featured in our simulation is provided in
the Supplementary Material.
In this portion of the study, we also compensated volunteers
from the 2018 World Pork Expo a slightly higher rate: Option
A $2.00 USD or $1.60 USD; $3.85 USD or $0.10 USD. Online
recruits were paid either $0.60 or $0.50 for Option A or were paid
$1.10 or $0.05 for Option B.
2.3. Statistical Methods
In our simulation, each decision whether or not to invest
resources in biosecurity has an associated financial risk. We
implemented a biosecurity investment rating, Ri defined in (14)
for each participant i. This is the weighted average of the player
Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org 5 January 2021 | Volume 7 | Article 556668
Clark et al. Emulating Agricultural Disease Management
facility biosecurity status across a set of decision months. For
each round, the biosecurity status (0 = “None,” 1 = “Low,” 2
= “Medium,” 3 = “High”) of the player’s facility is tallied and
then normalized by the total number of decisions. For example,
suppose for one round, participant j invested experimental
dollars to obtain “Low” biosecurity in month 3 of 6 and then
“Medium” biosecurity on month 5 of 6. Then Rj = 1.0= 16 · [0+
0+ 1+ 1+ 2+ 2]. More biosecurity reduces the risk of infection.
Hence, a higher biosecurity investment rating is associated with
more risk averse behaviors, which is an indication of participants’
risk preference.
Risk aversion in the paired lottery choice survey was measured
using the number of “safe” (Option A) choices registered by
each participant and then normalized by their total number of
decisions. For example, if a participant chose Option A 4 times
out of 10, their surveyed risk aversion score is 0.4, which would
be considered “risk neutral” behavior. More than 4 safe choices
correspond to more risk averse behavior while less than 4 choices
designate risk tolerant behavior. We chose this risk metric to be
consistent with (16).
Statistics were performed using Python 2.7 SciPy statistical
libraries (28). The two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test
(29) was implemented to compare risk lottery preferences
for consistency with (16). To quantify differences in risk
aversion with respect to biosecurity investment ratings between
sampled participants, we performed one-tailed Mann–Whitney
U-tests (30). We chose the U-test since in our previous study
(14) we found that the biosecurity investment ratings failed
the D’Agostino and Pearson’s test for normality (31, 32).
Preferential risk distributions were displayed using violin plots
(33). We tested statistical correlations between risk associated
with simulation decisions and the risk preference lottery using
Spearman’s rank (rs), correlation coefficient (34).
A demographic comparison between the World Pork Expo
and MTurk cohorts are given in the Supplementary Materials.
Demographic categorical frequencies comparing age, gender and
education between samples were differentiated using the Chi
Square (χ2) statistical test (35). We did not find evidence that
demographics effected the decision-making process.
3. RESULTS
We compare the decisions from 50 industry professionals and
stakeholders from the 2018 World Pork Expo to 50 MTurk
online participants. Additionally, we measured participants’ risk
preferences using the paired lottery choice assessment distributed
in our exit survey, and noted how these preferences contrast
with risk behaviors quantified using simulated biosecurity
investment management.
3.1. Biosecurity Investment Simulation
We compared the distributions of biosecurity investment ratings
between each set of participants using two-tailed Mann–Whitney
U-tests across each treatment. We did not detect a difference
in the distribution of biosecurity investment decisions between
Pork Expo participants andMTurk recruits.We summarize these
findings in Table 1. We also compared the session profit (i.e.,
TABLE 1 | Experimental treatment comparison.
Treatments Biosecurity (µ, σ ) U p-value
PE MTurk
All (1.38, 0.67) (1.43, 0.72) 1214.5 0.68
Din Visible (1.45, 0.67) (1.56, 0.71) 1157.0 0.42
Bio Visible (1.41, 0.65) (1.23, 0.72) 1445.0 0.24
Bio Hidden (1.33, 0.73) (1.56, 0.75) 1046.5 0.12
Bio Reveal (1.39, 0.71) (1.46, 0.78) 1211.0 0.66
Dis Hidden (1.37, 0.71) (1.43, 0.76) 1178.0 0.51
Dis Reveal (1.35, 0.72) (1.36, 0.78) 1266.5 0.97
Biosecurity Investment ratings per experimental scenario delineated for each sample of 50
participants, Pork Expo (PE) andMechanical Turk (MTurk). Comparisons are given for each
set of Disease (Dis) and Biosecurity (Bio) visibility treatments, along with rounds in which
participants can spend resources to reveal information regarding the infection and/or
biosecurity. Using two-tailed Mann–Whitney U-tests, no significant differences were found
in biosecurity investment across each set of experimental scenarios.
overall simulation dollars earned) between samples and did not
find a significant difference in earnings: PE [µ = 163,740.00;
σ = 48,997.07; min = 44,000; max = 258,000], MTurk [ µ =
172,620.00; σ = 38,612.89; min= 91,000.00; max= 263,000.00]:
U= 1,095.0, p= 0.2867 (two-tailed).
Although we did not find a significant difference between
biosecurity investment distributions or performance, we did,
however, detect a difference in the willingness to purchase
information regarding biosecurity and infection status. To
investigate hypothesis (H1) we tested two price levels, {$1,000,
$2,000}, for revealing the biosecurity rating or infection status
of 10 neighboring facilities. Comparatively, both groups invested
more resources in infection status information: Expo total
$401,000 (averaging $8020/person) v. MTurk total $316,000
(averaging $6,320/person). Overall, less resources were spent on
biosecurity information, however with a larger division between
cohorts: Expo total $256,000 (averaging $5,120/person) v. MTurk
total $119,000 (averaging $2,380/person).We then quantified this
difference in choices per participant between samples using the
Mann–Whitney U-test.
We found that the Pork Expo group chose to spend
significantly more money to reveal both biosecurity and infection
data than MTurk participants, when the price was $1,000
per reveal. The difference in biosecurity spending was highly
significant (p = 0.0013), while the difference in infection
reveals was marginally significant (p = 0.0487). However, if
we consider the power of the disease status result by adjusting
the p value to control for the false discovery rate (36) due to
performing 4 statistical tests, we find, (padj = 0.078), suggesting
more sampling may be required for verification. However, the
difference in biosecurity information spending between groups
was highly significant, even after adjustment (padj = 0.005).
In Figure 3, violin plots show each distribution of information
reveal choices ($1,000) per participant for disease status (orange)
and biosecurity (blue). There was no significant difference
between groups in spending to reveal biosecurity (p = 0.0587)
or disease (p = 0.2835) information when it cost $2,000 per
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FIGURE 3 | Information reveal choice comparison ($1,000/reveal) between 2018 World Pork Expo (PE) participants and Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). For each
group, per person choices to reveal biosecurity (blue) are overlaid with choices to reveal disease statuses (orange). The dotted line denotes the mean of each
distribution. For this experimental treatment, Pork Expo participants paid to reveal information more often than MTurk participants.
reveal (i.e., twice the price of increasing biosecurity). The results
from each Mann–Whitney U-test per experimental treatment
are given in Table 2. These results support hypothesis (H1) that
participants with industry knowledge will invest more resources
to reduce information uncertainty, given the stipulation that
pricing motivates differences in this decision mechanism.
We also considered the relationship between information
uncertainty reduction and biosecurity adoption. We may expect
that more risk aversion would be associated with more choices
to reveal information, however this was not supported by
the data. Quite conversely, we actually found a moderately
strong negative correlation from the MTurk cohort during both
infection uncertainty experimental treatments ($1,000,$2,000)
for participants who chose at least 1 infection information reveal:
[Spearman rho = −0.463, p < 0.01,N = 30]. For these
treatments, recruits from MTurk who revealed more infection
information tended to adopt less biosecurity. Interestingly, we
did not find evidence for this relationship from Pork Expo
attendees who chose at least 1 infection information reveal:
[Spearman rho = 0.014, p = 0.93,N = 36]. This highlights
another interesting difference between these groups. Perhaps,
for this subset of industry professionals, investing in additional
information did not deter their initiative to situationally adopt
biosecurity, whereas MTurk recruits may have been more
motivated for maximizing their earnings when investing in
TABLE 2 | Reveal treatment comparison.
Treatment Reveals (µ, σ ) U p-value
PE MTurk
Inf $1,000 (3.10, 3.07) (2.12, 2.93) 1481.5 0.0487
Inf $2,000 (2.46, 2.88) (2.10, 2.81) 1330.0 0.2835
Bio $1,000 (1.84, 2.27) (0.90, 1.77) 1651.5 0.0013
Bio $2,000 (1.64, 2.52) (0.74, 1.23) 1455.5 0.0587
Choices (per person) to invest economic resources to reveal biosecurity (bio) and infection
(inf) status for 2018 World Pork Expo Participants (PE) and Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). We found Expo participants chose (highly) significantly more biosecurity statuses
reveals and (marginally) significantly more infection status reveals when the cost was
$1,000/reveal (bold). No significant difference was measured when the cost of revealing
this information increased to $2,000 simulation dollars.
reducing uncertainty. We did not find any significant correlation
between risk associated with biosecurity adoption and number of
biosecurity information reveals from either cohort.
To further investigate this relationship between information
uncertainty reduction and biosecurity adoption, we compared
the risk preferences of participants who were willing to invest
resources in reducing information uncertainty compared to
those who opted out and never revealed infection and/or
biosecurity statuses. Applying Mann–Whitney U-tests, we did
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FIGURE 4 | Paired lottery choice survey risk preferences distributions comparing participants from the 2018 World Pork Expo and Amazon Mechanical Turk. The
dashed line represents the mean from each distribution. The solid line at 0.4 (i.e., 4/10 safe choices) denotes risk neutral behavior. Making more than 4 safe choices is
considered risk averse behavior while less than 4 safe choices is considered risk tolerant.
not find significant differences in biosecurity adoption between
Pork Expo participants who chose to reveal infection/disease
information and those who did not. In the MTurk cohort, we
did find that recruits who chose to reveal information adopted
less biosecurity for the $1,000 biosecurity reveal treatment [U =
167, p < 0.05 :µ1 = 1.041,N1 = 16 v. µ2 = 1.584,N2 =
34] and the $1,000 infection reveal treatment [U = 225, p <
0.05 :µ1 = 1.240,N1 = 26 v. µ2 = 1.595,N2 = 24]. This
supports our previous finding thatMTurk recruits may have been
more reluctant to diminish their potential earnings, while Pork
Expo attendees did not sacrifice biosecurity investment when also
purchasing additional information.
3.2. Paired Lottery Choice Risk
Comparison
We compared risk preference distributions between Pork Expo
participants [µ = 0.522, σ = 0.219,median = 0.500] and
online recruits from Amazon Mechanical Turk [µ = 0.518, σ =
0.199,median = 0.500]. Using a KS test, we did not find a
significant difference in risk distributions between each sample
: KS [U = 0.06, p = 0.999, n1 = n2 = 50]. In Figure 4, the
risk preference distributions compare choices from each sample.
As defined in (16), a risk neutral preference is defined as 0.4
(4/10) safe choices (i.e., “Option A”). More than 4 safe choices
are deemed as risk averse, while less is considered risk tolerant.
Under this metric, the majority of participants in both samples
were categorized as risk averse. For Pork Expo participants,
31 (62%) were classified as risk averse, 8 were risk tolerant
(16%), and 11 were risk neutral (22%). Mechanical Turk recruits
followed a similar distribution: 32 Risk Averse (64%), 11 Risk
Tolerant (22%), and 7 were risk neutral (14%).
We also considered the consistency in selections between
each group of participants. We would expect that the majority
of participants would begin with the safe “Option A” before
eventually switching to the more risky “Option B” for the
remainder of the survey. In (16) the majority of participants
only switch once from “Option A” to “Option B,” however there
were cases of multiple switching from their sampled participants.
We found the majority of our participants also only switched
their responses one time. From the Mechanical Turk group, 2
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participants (4%) didn’t switch, 44 participants (88%) switched
once, 2 participants (4%) switched twice, 1 participant (2%)
switched 3 times, and 1 participant (2%) switched more than 3
times. Themajority of the Pork Expo attendees also only switched
once, however there were more cases of multiples switches: 3
participants (6%) didn’t switch, 30 participants (60%) switched
once, 6 participants (12%) switched twice, 5 participants (10%)
switched 3 times, and 6 participants (12%) switched more than
3 times.
We investigate hypothesis (H2) by comparing risk associated
with simulated biosecurity investment to decisions in the paired
lottery choice assessment. We did not find a direct correlation
between risk preference and biosecurity investment strategies for
either sample: (Spearman) Pork Expo rs = 0.086, p = 0.54;
MTurk rs = 0.218, p = 0.12; All rs = 0.142, p = 0.156. We
considered differences between simulated biosecurity investment
with respect to risk classification under the preferential lottery
(risk averse vs. risk tolerant in Figure 4), however since the
majority in each group were risk averse, we could not reliably test
this significantly. Given these results, we couldn’t find evidence to
support hypothesis (H2), that risk associated with our simulation
will correspond with paired lottery choice assessment.
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
To further explore potential differences in decision making
between industry professionals and online recruits, we analyzed
their choices regarding paying to gain situational awareness in
an experimental game and their decisions in a paired lottery
choice survey. We wanted to understand the magnitude of these
differences to be able to determine the sample size needed to
quantify efficacy of risk communication strategies. We did not
find a measurable difference in the distributions of biosecurity
investment decisions betweenWorld Pork Expo participants and
online recruits from Amazon Mechanical Turk across each set of
experimental information treatments.
We observed a difference in the willingness of participants
to purchase information regarding neighboring infection and
biosecurity status. In support of hypothesis (H1), we found
participants from the World Pork Expo chose more often to
reduce uncertainty in this decision making process. We note cost
was a motivator in this decision making process, and at higher
costs we found no significant differences in purchasing disease
or biosecurity information. The most pronounced difference
was the amount of spending by Pork Expo participants on
neighboring biosecurity status information. Overall, both groups
invested the most resources on reducing uncertainty around
disease spread. Pork Expo participants, perhaps due to their
industry profiles, had significantly more interest in neighboring
biosecurity configurations than MTurk recruits. This distinction
may indicate that reducing uncertainty regarding the spread of
disease and neighboring biosecurity protection is of particular
interest to industry professionals when weighing their risk of
infection throughout this decision making process.
Interestingly, we did not find a direct association between
lottery risk preference and biosecurity investment decisions,
leading us to reject hypothesis (H2) for this sample of
participants. One possibility for this lack of consistency in
observed behaviors across the two risk assessment methods is
the contextual framing that’s motivating decisions within the
experimental gaming simulation. The lottery risk preference may
be contrasted as a measure of pure economic risk preference.
Our simulated environment creates a more complex and realistic
economic dilemma to tackle. This difference is especially
highlighted during rounds that inject additional uncertainty in
the decision making process by masking the spread of infection
and/or shielding neighboring biosecurity configurations.
This provides support for harnessing experimental gaming
simulations to study behavioral risk. Experimental gaming
simulations may be especially useful for emulating complex
decision mechanisms in which nuanced behavioral signals
may be difficult to capture using generalized risk assessment
survey strategies. Further investigation is needed to accentuate
these differences in behavioral responses associated with added
contextual framing provided by experimental simulations,
in comparison to traditional survey methods for measuring
risk preference.
Overall, the distributions of risk associated with our
biosecurity investment simulation were statistically comparable
to our sample of 50 industry professionals and stakeholders from
the 2018 World Pork Expo. Additionally, we found no difference
between these two audiences in their performance from the
lottery risk preference assessment portion of the experiment. Our
findings lend support to using large samples of online recruits,
such as MTurk, for identifying general trends in risk attitude and
perception. Validation using a sample of participants with related
industry knowledge provides confidence for behavioral analyses
using experimental gaming simulations.
Potential bias in our results stem from Mechanical Turk
participants completing this experiment fully digitally, while
participants from the World Pork Expo underwent the
simulation in-person during their attendance at the event. The
payment scale was the only adjustment between administered
digital application interfaces. Differences we are finding in
strategies could be affected by Pork Expo attendees’ current
immersion in the subject material. This may also strengthen
our result that the risk distributions with regards to biosecurity
investment were similar. We also were limited by our sample
size, as recruiting industry professionals is challenging in
comparison to online survey marketplaces like MTurk. Hence, it
is possible that a larger sampling of participants with an industry
background are required to detect differences in behavior. These
relationships between industry professionals and online recruits
should be further validated when analyzing risk preferences
associated with industry-specific decision making.
While comparing decision consistency in the paired lottery
choice portion of the risk assessment, we found more Pork
Expo participants (≈ 40%) switched more than once between
the safer “Option A” and more risky “Option B” in comparison
to the MTurk sample. This is slightly more switching than
may be expected. Perhaps this could have been due to survey
fatigue, as the Pork Expo attendees were attending the fair
recreationally, whereas the MTurk recruits were seeking an
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employment opportunity. Also, the final lottery choice sets the
high payouts for both Option A and Option B at 10/10, so the
most rational decision is to choose Option B for this last question.
Although the vast majority of participants from both cohorts
finished with “Option B,” there was 1 case from the MTurk group
and 8 cases from the Pork Expo attendees ending with “Option
A.” This difference could also be a sign of potential survey
fatigue, or a misunderstanding of the lottery payouts for the final
question. Overall the proportion of safe choices between each
cohort was comparable and hence this metric for risk aversion
was ideal for comparing behavior.
The decision-making data collected from experimental
gaming simulations is not only informative in itself but
also a valuable resource for disease-spread models lacking a
human behavioral component. For example, agent based models
(ABMs), (37), are computer simulations that can help forecast
outcomes of decisions and interactions of entities (or agents)
and their impact on the system. Agent based modeling has
been applied to agriculture for producer decision interaction,
(38), technology and policy modeling, (39), as well as for
water management (40). ABMs can provide insights into
epidemiological factors that exacerbate disease spread and their
economic impacts on agricultural supply chains (41, 42). Human
behavioral components, captured using digital experimental
simulations, can then be used to model systemic outbreaks
and how disease spread will change as human behavior is
altered or risk communication strategies are devised (43). The
distributions of behavioral risk observed in our biosecurity
experimental gaming simulations can be embedded in these
agent based models to test how proportions of risk aversion effect
the spread of disease. The model can then be calibrated using
real world estimates of viral incidence. Experimental gaming
simulations can also provide insights into how individuals
may adapt their risk preferences over time. Individuals may
learn to become more or less risk averse in response to their
simulated outcomes. Studying how different proportions of
these risk attitudes effect the spread of disease can help gain
insights into forecasting economic impacts and how different
risk landscapes impact the well-being of the system. This may
be useful to policy regulators interested in developing and testing
risk communication strategies that nudge behaviors toward more
risk averse disease management practices to help stem the spread
of disease.
Experimental gaming simulations are effective tools for
examining behaviors surrounding risk associated with
agricultural disease mitigation. These readily adaptable
simulations allow us to tailor interfaces for capturing subtle
behavioral differences while also harnessing population-wide
patterns that can be useful for modeling behaviors associated
with disease management and prevention. While we do not
endorse moving solely to experimental gaming simulations for
gathering human behavioral data, our research demonstrates
how the additional context provided via simulation can capture
distinct behaviors potentially missed using traditional survey
methods. Moreover, experimental gaming simulations can
increase salience and engagement by immersing participants
in real-world dilemmas, thus providing an alternative
viewpoint that may more closely approximate real world
behavior, and could be used in conjunction with traditional
methods to improve our understanding of human decision
making processes.
Understanding how behavior in simulated gaming
environments translates to real world decisions by industry
professionals is an important consideration of this behavioral
research. This is still an open question that we’ll continue to
investigate through our research agenda. Rigorous behavioral
validation is challenging due to the vast number of decisions that
are tested in our simulation, and by design, farmers are unlikely
to have experienced these specific decisions in the real world.
The flexibility of the gaming environment to gather behaviors
across a multitude of possible scenarios can provide insights
into risk management investment strategies that may be difficult
to discern using traditional survey instruments. We are also
working toward adapting our behavioral games into digital tools
and interfaces that may allow industry professionals to emulate
their own production system. Creating these decision support
tools from our experimental game design may help us better
investigate how choices in a simulated environment relate to
real-world behavior. This evolution of our experimental gaming
simulations into decision support applications may provide
insight into the decision making process to mitigate the spread
of disease.
Online survey marketplaces, like MTurk, can provide an
effective and rapid medium for recruitment in behavioral
research studies. We found that the distributions of risk
associated with disease management were comparable between
a sample of industry professionals and online recruits. We
also identified aspects in which industry knowledge can differ
throughout the presented risk dilemma. In particular, we found
those with an industry background had a greater propensity to
reduce uncertainty in the decision making process. Our study
demonstrates the importance of validating simulated behaviors
using a sample of participants with industry knowledge, in
order to identify and account for potential differences that
may be associated with their agricultural background. The
similarities in general behavioral risk we’ve further investigated
in this study also help validate our findings in Clark et al.
(14), which tested hypotheses on a much larger sample (N =
1, 000) of online recruits. Our research framework highlights the
viability of online marketplaces for behavioral analysis, while
also demonstrating how targeted recruitment from industry
stakeholders can provide additional insights into these complex
decision mechanisms.
Managing the economic factors associated with disease
risk management is a complex quandary. Here we quantify
behavioral aspects of the decision making under risk associated
with mitigating the spread of disease while maximizing profits
using experimental gaming simulations. Importantly, we found
that risk preferences assigned via the paired lottery choice
survey were not adequate in predicting behaviors in our
simulated environment. These studied behaviors and their
effect on the well-being of the system as a whole should be
further investigated for the promotion of healthier agricultural
production networks.
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